We consider the plant location decision of a multinational corporation (MNC), which has the option to invest in a more or in a less technologically lagging country, and which aims to use its foreign plant as an export-platform. We show that the plant location decision of the MNC depends on whether the host country firms can export, and on whether they are able to compete in the product market. We also show that a conflict of interest does not necessarily arise between the plant location decision of the MNC and the preferences of the host countries' governments.
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Introduction
A fascinating development in economics in recent decades has been the phenomenal growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) . This has generated a large theoretical and empirical literature. 1 A number of papers have attempted to explain why multinational corporations (MNCs) invest in a host country with the aim of serving either that host country market (horizontal FDI), or the home country by exporting back to it (vertical FDI).
However, another type of equally important FDI, the so called "export-platform FDI", is still not well understood and has started getting attention only recently. Export-platform FDI refers to a situation where a MNC invests in a host country and exports its products from the host country to one or more third countries.
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As documented in Ekholm et al. (2005) : "In 2000, 64% of total sales of foreign manufacturing affiliates of US multinationals were sold domestically, while 36% were exported. Out of the latter figure, about a third were exported back to the US and about two thirds were exported to third countries." Based on data from Maskus (2001, 2002) about US MNCs operating in the EU, Southeast Asia, and Canada and Mexico (the US's NAFTA partners), Ekholm et al. (2005) also document that countries such as Ireland, Belgium, and Holland have the highest proportions of affiliate sales going to third countries (respectively 71, 57, and 60 percent), while Canada and Mexico have the lowest shares (respectively 5 and 8 percent). The above evidence shows the importance of exportplatform FDI, which certainly deserves attention.
Theoretical works explaining the rationale for undertaking export-platform FDI are growing in number. Norman and Motta (1993) , Motta and Norman (1996) , Neary (2002) , Fumagalli (2003) , and Ekholm et al. (2005) show how differences between external and internal tariff barriers, market size, and host country subsidies can create an incentive for foreign firms to undertake export-platform FDI.
Our focus is different. Instead of focusing on the rationale for export-platform FDI,
we construct a game-theoretic model aimed at explaining the plant location decision of a MNC, which has already decided to undertake export-platform FDI, and has the option to locate its plant in one of two host countries differentiated by the technological capabilities of their local firms. 3 Hence, our paper falls in the area of the literature explaining the plant location decisions of those MNCs performing export-platform FDI. 4 Most previous studies have focused on the implications of strategic government policies on MNCs' plant location decisions. In contrast, we discuss the platform choice through technological factors and in the absence of government policies.
Our model predicts that in the absence of exporting by the host country firms, and if all host country firms are able to compete in the product market, the MNC will invest in the more technologically lagging country. On the other hand, if technological differences prevent the firm in the more technologically lagging host country from competing in the product market, the MNC will invest in the less technologically lagging country, as long as the technological difference between the MNC and the firm in the less lagging country is sufficiently large. If the technological gap between the firms is such that all firms can compete in the market, exporting by the host country firms reduces the MNC's incentive for investing in the more technologically lagging country. On the other hand, if the firm in the more technologically lagging host country cannot compete in the market, exporting by the firm in the less lagging host country increases the MNC's incentive to invest in the more lagging country. Finally, our model also suggests that a conflict of interest does not necessarily arise between the MNC's investment decision and the preferences of the host countries' governments.
Our model is strongly related to Fumagalli's (2003) , who also considers technological differences between firms. However, our analysis differs from hers in five important ways. First, contrary to her, we consider segmented markets (and therefore, price discrimination between the host country markets), and allow for transportation costs between the host countries. Second, Fumagalli (2003) restricts her attention to a situation where the technological differences are such that all firms always produce positive outputs in the market, whereas, along with this possibility, we also consider the situation where technological differences prevent a host country firm from producing (leading to an asymmetric host country market structure). Third, unlike Fumagalli (2003) , we consider an effective patent protection in the host countries that prevents knowledge spillovers between the MNC and the host country firms. Fourth, contrary to Fumagalli (2003) , we show that whether the host country firms export or not has important implications on the plant location decision of the foreign firm. Lastly, Fumagalli's (2003) main focus is on the effects of subsidy competition between two host countries which happen to be differentiated by the technology of their local firms, while we show the direct implications of the technological differences between the firms on the plant location decision of the MNC.
Our results differ from Fumagalli's (2003) in two main respects. First, in a situation comparable to ours (i.e. when there is no subsidy competition and technological differences allow all firms to compete in the product market), Fumagalli (2003) shows that if the MNC decides to invest in a host country, it always invests in the less technologically lagging country. On the contrary, our results show that if the host country firms do not export, the MNC always prefers to invest in the more technologically lagging host country, whereas if the host country firms do export, there are situations where the MNC may prefer to invest in the less technologically lagging country. Second, contrary to Fumagalli (2003) , our results show that a conflict between the interest of the MNC and the preferences of the host countries' governments does not necessarily arise, implying that there might be no scope for subsidy competition. Our assumptions of segmented markets and transportation costs between the host countries are responsible for these differences in results.
Our model is also close to Bjorvatn and Eckel's (2006) . Yet, their main focus is on the policy competition for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries.
Moreover, while they consider a scenario where there is a local firm only in one of the two host countries, we consider a MNC's plant location decision when there is a host country firm in each of the host countries, and characterise the equilibrium location decision with respect to the cost differences between the firms. 5 Finally, we show the implications of both exporting and non-exporting by the host country firms, while Bjorvatn and Eckel's (2006) always consider exporting by the host country firms.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and illustrates the effects of technological difference between the MNC and the host country firms on the plant location decision of the former, both in the absence and in the 5 In a situation comparable to ours (i.e. with no government intervention and the same host country market size), Bjorvatn and Eckel's (2006) analysis suggests that the MNC will always invest in the country with no host country firm. Like them, we envisage a scenario with no firm in one of the host countries if large technological differences prevent the firm operating in that host country to compete in the product market. However, contrary to Bjorvatn and Eckel's (2006) , we show that in this scenario, the MNC will not necessarily invest in the country with no host country firm, as long as the MNC and the firm in the other (less technologically lagging) country are sufficiently differentiated from a technological viewpoint. 6 Non-exporting by the host country firms may be motivated by resource constraints or inefficient transportation technologies, which may make exporting unprofitable to them.
presence of exporting by the latter. Welfare implications for the host countries are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
The model
Setup
Consider a MNC, firm X , which intends to serve the demand of two countries, A and B .
We assume that the markets in A and B are segmented. We also assume that there is a local firm in each country, and call these firms, respectively, A and B . By assumption, firm X does not find it profitable to export to these host countries from its home country, X . 7 Moreover, as in Barros and Cabral (2003) , Dewit et al. (2003) , Fumagalli (2003) , Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) (Haaparanta, 1996; Barros and Cabral, 2000; Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006 etc.) This assumption may be motivated in the light of the fact that the global sales by foreign affiliates of multinationals exceed worldwide exports of goods and services (United Nations, 1995 , 1996 , which suggests that, due to relatively high trade costs, firms tend to serve foreign markets by establishing foreign production subsidiaries rather than by producing domestically and exporting. The assumption of no exporting to the host countries from the home country also rules out the possibility of exporting back to the home country from either of these host countries. If there is demand in the home country, it will be satisfied by home production. Given that the markets are segmented, the inclusion of home demand will not add any new feature to our analysis. We, therefore, ignore demand in the home country for simplicity. Norman and Motta (1993) , Motta and Norman (1996) , Barros and Cabral (2000) , Neary (2002) , Fumagalli (2003) , Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) etc. also assume that no exporting to the home country can take place from the host countries. 8 The implicit assumption here is that factor prices are taken as given in our analysis. 9 The assumption of 0 = X c is due to analytical convenience. It does not affect our qualitative results. 10 Milner (2005) shows that even if tariff barriers have been reduced in recent years, international transportation costs are still significant and create sufficiently large trade costs. This conclusion is echoed in Hummels (1991) , according to whom transport costs often represent a greater barrier to trade than tariffs. studies in this area (mentioned above), we assume that firm X cannot enter foreign markets by licensing its technology to either of these firms.
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To determine whether firm X will locate its plant in country A or country B, we will consider the following two scenarios:
Both firms A and B are assumed to serve only the respective local markets.
This may happen if the host country firms face resource constraints or if the transportation technologies of the host country firms are so inefficient to make exporting by these firms unprofitable.
(ii) Firms A and B can also export and, like firm X , each host country firm faces the transportation cost . t
Within each of these two scenarios, the following two situations will be considered:
The technological difference between firms X and B is so large that firm B cannot compete with firm X , irrespective of whether X undertakes FDI in country A or country B , thus creating an asymmetric market structure in the host countries.
(ii) The technological differences between the firms are such that all host country firms always produce in the respective markets, leading to competition between the host country firms and the MNC in each of the host countries.
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To eliminate the effect of market size on the investment decision of firm X, we assume that demand is the same in both countries A and B . A higher market size in one country would in fact increase the incentive for investment in that country. The inverse demand function in each host country is given by
, where q is total output sold in that country, and p the associated market price. Throughout the analysis, we assume that , which always ensures positive outputs by firm t a 2 > X in both markets.
No exporting by the host country firms
We initially assume that both firms A and B serve the respective local markets only. We start by analysing the plant location choice of firm X , under the assumption that firm B is very inefficient technologically, and therefore unable to compete with firm X . Under these circumstances, firm X becomes a monopolist in country B .
We consider the following game. At stage 1, firm X decides whether to invest in country A or B . At stage 2, the firms make their output decisions as Cournot duopolists with homogenous products. We solve the game through backward induction.
Let us first consider the situation where firm X decides to invest in country A and export to country B . In this situation, firm X 's profit is 
The equilibrium outputs are then
and the second order conditions for profit maximization are satisfied. It should be noted that the equilibrium output of firm A is positive if and only if 2 a c A < .
Substituting the equilibrium outputs into the profit functions, we get the equilibrium profits of firms X and A, which are respectively
Next, let us consider the case where firm X locates its plant in country B and exports to country A . In this situation, the profit of firm X is ( ) 
The equilibrium outputs are In order to ensure that the equilibrium output of firm A is always positive both when plant X is located in country A and when it is located in country B , must be less than A c 2 a . For simplicity, we assume that this is always the case (i.e. 2 a c A < ). This helps us to avoid corner solutions, without sacrificing any insight for our analysis.
Substituting the equilibrium outputs into each firm's profit function, we obtain f t c a a
The comparison of (3) and (7) shows that
which is equivalent to
for . Whether or depends both on the technological factors and the transportation cost, t. Given that , it follows that
The following Proposition follows from the above discussion. If, on the other hand, the technological difference between firms X and A is sufficiently small (i.e.
), investment in country
A does not allow firm X to monopolise the market in country A . In this situation, firm X prefers to avoid the distortion on its monopoly profit in country B , which would be created by the transportation cost while exporting from country A . Therefore, in the presence of small technological differences between firms X and A , firm X invests in country B.
Since a lower transportation cost reduces firm X's cost of exporting to country B from country A, it increases firm X's incentive for monopolising the market in country A.
As a result, a lower transportation cost increases the range of for which firm X finds it profitable to invest in country A (note that declines with t). Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuition for the above Proposition is as follows. Since the market size is the same in both host countries, and since firm A is more cost efficient than firm B , firm X earns higher profits in country B (compared to country A) irrespective of whether it serves country B through FDI or exporting. However, since transportation costs create a distortion in the output choice of firm X , firm X 's total gain from investing in country B (which comprises the sum of its profits from country B under FDI and from country A under export) is always higher than its total gain from investing in country A (which includes its profits from country A under FDI and from country B under export). This induces firm X to invest in country B . 13 The main cause of the inefficiencies characterizing the former centrally planned economies were the soft budget constraints, i.e. the subsidies typically paid by the state to the loss-making firms to guarantee their survival (Kornai, 1986 (Kornai, , 1993 . In the presence of soft budget constraints, the natural selection which market competition performs by eliminating non-viable organizations fails to occur, conserving inefficiency. 14 This link between our model's predictions and the actual FDI trends observed in Europe can be established by considering firm X as a "world" multinational, which has the option to invest either in a less technologically lagging Western European country (country A) or in a more technologically lagging CEEC (country B). It should be noted, however, that, while our model only focuses on the effects of technological factors on multinationals' location decisions, other factors such as wage and tax differentials, as well as the level of bureaucracy and corruption in the host countries also play prominent roles in these decisions. Moreover, because our model is micro-based and refers to the behavior of a single MNC, all links established between our predictions and country-level FDI trends should be interpreted with caution. Proposition 2 may be used to explain why, over the period 1991-97, the share of world FDI received by the increasingly productive post-transition CEECs rose significantly (Table 1) .
Exporting by the host country firms
So far, we have considered that the host country firms only serve the respective local markets. This may be due to high cost of exporting or financial constraints. We now show how our results are affected if we allow the host country firms to export to other countries, facing the same transportation costs as firm X .
Let us first consider the situation where only firms A and X can compete in the market (i.e. firm B is characterized by a large technological inefficiency, which prevents it from competing in the product market). The following Proposition shows the investment decision of firm X in this situation. 
Welfare implications for the host countries
We now look at the implications of the plant location decision of the MNC on the welfare of the host countries. As in Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) , we define welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and profit of the local firm. We study the welfare implications for our basic model focusing on the scenario where the host country firms do not export, and show that a conflict of interest between the MNC's investment decision and the preferences of the host countries' governments does not necessarily arise. The analysis can easily be extended to incorporate exporting by the host country firms. (ii) Country B always prefers investment by firm X in country B .
If there is no local competition in country B , welfare in this country is determined only by its consumer surplus, which is higher when firm X invests in country B rather than in country A . Hence, in the absence of local competition, country B is always better off if firm X invests in B . This result does not necessarily hold in the presence of local competition in country B .
Let us now consider the alternative situation where technological differences are such that all firms compete in the market. If firm X invests in country A , welfare of
and welfare of country B is
If, on the other hand, firm X invests in country B , then welfare of country A is
Comparisons of (14) and (16), on the one hand, and of (15) and (17), on the other,
give the following Proposition.
Proposition 6: Country A ( B ) prefers investment by firm X in country A ( B ) if
).
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15 Note that t must be less than to generate a positive output for firm a X when it exports.
Comparing Propositions 1 and 5, on the one hand, and Propositions 2 and 6, on the other, suggests that a conflict of interest between the MNC and the host country does not necessarily arise. In some cases, FDI would in fact automatically flow to a given country, making it unnecessary for this country to pay subsidies in order to attract FDI. Whether a conflict of interest actually exists between the MNC and the host country, and whether the governments of the host countries have incentives for attracting investment by the MNCs depend therefore on technological differences, and more in general, on the parameter configurations. Consequently, there may be scenarios in which there is no scope for subsidy competition between the possible host countries of the type illustrated in Barros and Cabral (2000) and Fumagalli (2003) .
Conclusion
We have developed a simple game theoretic model to analyze the effects of technological asymmetries on the plant location decisions of a MNC, which has the option to invest in a more or in a less technologically lagging country, and which aims to use its foreign plant as an export-platform. We have shown that whether the MNC prefers to invest in the relatively more or in the relatively less technologically lagging host country depends on the technological differences between the MNC and the host country firms, and on the possibility of exporting by the latter. Specifically, our model predicts that in the absence of exporting by the host country firms, and if the technological differences between the firms are such that all firms always compete in the product market, the MNC will invest in the more technologically lagging host country. However, if large technological differences prevent the host country firms in the more technologically lagging country from competing in the product market, then the MNC will invest in the less lagging host country, as long as the technological difference between the MNC and the firm in the latter country is sufficiently large. Though we have focused on technological aspects to explain the plant location decision of our MNC, it also emerges from our analysis that the governments of the host countries may or may not have incentives to compete in order to attract foreign investment.
A natural extension to this paper would therefore aim at considering the effects of strategic host country policies to attract FDI, in the case of conflicting interests between the MNC and the host countries' governments. We intend to explore this issue in future research.
It is also worth mentioning that considering more than two symmetric host country firms would not affect our qualitative results when all firms are competing, provided that the number of firms in all host countries is the same. However, if the number of firms differs between host countries, this will affect the MNC's incentive for investment in a particular country. For example, a sufficiently large number of firms in the more technologically lagging host country (compared to the less lagging one) may reduce the MNC's incentive for investing there, by significantly reducing its profits in that country.
Finally, it should also be noted that our analysis has abstracted from product differentiation, as we have assumed that all firms produce homogeneous products. The presence of product differentiation would reduce the possibility of monopolization, and would therefore affect the MNC's investment decision accordingly. For example, if technological differences prevented the more technologically inefficient host country firm from competing, then product differentiation could increase the possibility of investment in the more lagging country by reducing the monopolization effect in the less lagging country.
A. Proof of Proposition 2
Let us first consider the situation where firm X decides to invest in country A and export to country B . In this situation, considering that all firms compete in the market regardless of the investment decision of firm X, the profit of firm X is ( ) 
B. Proof of Proposition 3
In a scenario where only firms A and X can compete in the product market, the profit of 
C. Proof of Proposition 4
In a scenario where all firms compete in the market regardless of the investment decision of firm X, the profits of firm X from investing in countries A and B are respectively B . This is in contrast to Proposition 2, which showed that, when the host country firms are not exporting, firm X always prefers to invest in country B .
It should be noted that (A.17) and (A.18) assume that all firms always produce positive outputs. However, even if firms A and B have the option to export, transportation costs may not make exporting profitable for them. This is more likely to affect firm B since it is relatively cost inefficient compared to firm A . Therefore, while making its investment decision, it is important for firm X to consider the implication of its decisions on the profitability of exporting by the host country firms. which is greater than (A.18). Hence, the possibility of exporting by the host country firms may encourage firm X to invest in country A. QED. 
